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Abstract 
 
The objectives of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) include ways to improve the democratic 
and international images of the European Union (EU). The focus of the literature has so far 
focused on the overall treaty impact and on the EU´s international role. This paper considers 
instead its impact on the question of the democratic accountability of the EU´s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension 
(CSDP). 
This paper consists of three parts:  (1) The first part describes the changes the LT has 
made for the European Parliament (EP) in terms of its external relations. (2) The second part 
presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in its foreign, security and defence policies. 
(3) The third part offers a preliminary analysis of the recently created Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference (IPC) on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) includes 
parliamentarians from the national EU parliaments.  
The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development in trying to bridge 
those existing democratic gaps, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence 
of many such deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and of its member 
states. 
                                                     
 Stelios Stavridis (PhD in International Relations, LSE London, 1991) is now an ARAID Senior Research Fellow in 
the Research Unit on Global Governance and the European Unión, University of Zaragoza, Spain. He is also 
currently an Honorary Associate Research Fellow, United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and 
Mobility (UNU-GCM) in Barcelona (July 2014-March 2015). He has also taught and researched at post-doctoral 
level or as visiting professor in various European universities and research centres including: King´s College 
London, The University of Reading (where he also held a Jean Monnet Chair and was the Director of its Centre for 
Euro-Mediterranean Studies), the Institut d´Études Européennes (Université Libre de Bruxelles), the European 
University Institute in Florence (as a Jean Monnet Fellow), ELIAMEP Athens (as a Marie Curie Fellow), UAB 
Barcelona, LUISS Rome, and Sciences-Po Bordeaux. His latest publication include: (with Olivier Costa and Clarissa 
Dri) Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization (Palgrave, 2013); and (with Andrea Cofelice), 
“The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)”, European Foreign Affairs Review 
19(2): 145-178, May 2014. A first draft of this paper was presented to the Panel on "The European Parliament as an 
International Actor" at the Conference on Elections and Democracy in Europe organized by Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel (VUB) & the Swedish Network for European Studies (SNES), held in Brussels on 7-9 April 2014. 
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Introduction 
 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT)1 provides new means, measures and mechanisms to improve the 
democratic and international images of the European Union (EU) as a whole. Analysts also claim 
that it is the ‘Treaty of Parliaments’2, because both the European Parliament (EP) and the 
member states national parliaments have gained powers in the EU’s processes of policy and 
decision-making3. 
 
As far as internal (´EU´) democratization is concerned, the main EU changes refer to the election 
of the Commission President after an EP input following Euro-elections. This is happening right 
now (time of writing July 2014) and attracts strong interest as a result of the May 2014 EP 
elections. This is not however the focus of this study. 
 
The focus of the literature that is relevant to this study has so far concerned the overall treaty 
impact on the EU´s international role. The verdict appeared initially to be rather positive: the 
Treaty now provides the EU with the means necessary for it to become a full-fledged 
international actor through a series of changes (Smith M. 2011; Comelli 2010; Quille 2010. See 
also Smith K. 2012)4. 
 
However, more recent literature tends to qualify substantially those earlier assumptions of 
Lisbon facilitating a more efficient foreign policy system at the EU level (for an overview, see 
Keukeleire, Delreux 2014: 58). No doubt new powers or new institutional arrangements are by 
definition necessary but not sufficient means to improve a system. Practice is what matters at the 
end of the day. The past few years seem to have brought to light at least three ongoing 
weaknesses (Menon 2011) in the fields of coherence, capabilities (especially over defence 
issues), and political will to act. One cannot simply decide they should happen. 
 
As noted, this paper is not however on the implications of Lisbon on the external dimension of 
EU integration. It focuses instead on its impact on the EP´s international role, and more 
specifically on the question of democratic accountability over the EU´s Common Foreign and 
                                                     
1 The Lisbon Treaty (LT) (signed in 2007) came into force on 1 December 2009. The failed Constitutional Treaty 
that preceded it was also concluded after a long intergovernmental conference that included a large number of 
parliamentarians. See a literature review in Church, Phinnemore (2010). 
2 On parliamentary democracy and the LT, see Barón Crespo (2012). 
3 The control of national parliaments over the EU decision-making process has been enhanced through the so-called 
early warning mechanism and the informal Barroso Initiative (Jančić 2012; Kiiver 2011). As for the EP, its powers 
are increased substantially through the introduction of co-decision as the ordinary legislative procedure: the EP is 
now “an equal counterpart to the Council and the Commission” (Church, Phinnemore 2010: 17). 
4 These changes include: (i) endowing the Union with its own legal personality which increases its visibility and 
impact at the international level and by implication those of the EP; (ii) upgrading the figure of the High 
Representative who now also acts as one of the European Commission Vice-Presidents, institutionally linking the 
Union’s foreign and external policies, and drawing into the international domain many, if not most, of the internal 
EU policies; (iii) the now permanent President of the European Council also possesses a number of prerogatives in 
the external representation of the EU; (iv) the establishment of a European External Action Service, which became 
operative on 1 December 2010 (Carta 2013; Lequesne 2013), allows for “comprehensive use [of the Union´s] 
diplomatic, trade, development and crisis management instruments” (Quille 2010: 56); (v) the introduction of a 
solidarity clause which resembles the classic mechanism of automatic collective defence (complemented with the 
management of natural or man-made disasters and crises) provides for solidarity among its members. 
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Security Policy, including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (respectively 
CFSP and CSDP5). 
 
This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part very briefly describes the changes the LT has 
made. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in foreign, security 
and defence policies, at all its levels of governance in those areas. (3) The third part offers a 
descriptive analysis of the recently created Inter-parliamentary Conference on 
CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) also includes national EU parliaments.  
 
The paper concludes that although the IPC on CFSP/CSDP is a positive development, it remains 
only a step in the right direction due to the existence of other democratic deficits in the foreign, 
security and defence policies of the EU and its member states. 
 
 
PART 1: What changes for the European Parliament´s external role after Lisbon? 
 
Even though there existed formal and informal means of influence that applied to major EU trade 
agreements even prior to Lisbon Treaty (Woolcock 2010: 8), the LT has further strengthened the 
EP´s clout in the following ways. All key aspects of external trade have now come under EU 
exclusive competence (Woolcock 2010: 9). Therefore, there are no longer mixed agreements 
where EU member states and their parliaments would have a say. Moreover, all services and 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property now also come under EU competence, even if 
unanimity in some politically sensitive sectors has been preserved. Most importantly, foreign 
direct investment comes under EU exclusive competence (Woolcock 2010: 9-10).  
 
The European Parliament (EP) possesses the right of consent but not that of initiative on the 
following international agreements concluded by the EU: 
(1) association agreements; 
(2) agreement on EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;  
(3) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation 
procedures;  
(4) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(5) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or 
the special legislative procedure where consent by the EP is required. 
 
In addition, the EP must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure of 
conclusion of international agreements. 
 
Yet the EP prerogatives in its external relations remain rather meagre, especially in foreign 
policy. In CFSP/CSDP, the EP is merely “consulted” on the main aspects and the basic choices 
of these policies and informed of their evolution. Its formal involvement consists of receiving 
information, holding progress debates twice a year, putting questions to the Council, making 
recommendations to the Council and the High Representative, and having its views “duly taken 
into account”. 
 
                                                     
5 The CSDP is the successor to the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). 
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One may therefore rightly still speak of the existence of a parliamentary deficit in the making of 
decisions in EU external relations (e.g. Thym 2010, Sjursen 2011)6. 
 
 
PART 2:  Democratic control and legitimacy in CFSP/CSDP: the seven democratic deficits 
 
Any discussion about how to control democratically the EU´s CFSP/CSDP always brings about 
questions about its desirability and feasibility, let alone the existence of such policies. It goes 
now beyond doubt that there is an EU foreign, security and defence policy. What its impact is 
remains the real issue. The view that there exists a CFSP/CSDP does not only reflect the 
existence of several agreements, treaties, including the LT, but also the generally accepted view 
in academia nowadays that EU foreign policy represents “the sum of what the EU and its 
member states do in international relations” (Hill 1998: 18). Moreover, there is now a yearly 
edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, an ECFR initiative (www.ecfr.eu), which, in 
its latest edition in 2014, consisted of 135 pages. The Journal of Common Market Studies has 
also produced for years now a section on “Europe and the Rest of the World” in its Annual 
Review (see Hadfield, Fiott 2014)7. 
 
Thus, the real issue remains what is its actual impact. However one should not confuse results 
with impact as very often the foreign policy of any given state does not produce the expected 
results. Yet, this does not mean that the policy does not exist in the first place. Therefore, the 
question of control from a democratic perspective becomes crucial because the EU is a collection 
of democratic states and it claims to be so (there are far too many numerous treaties and 
declarations in this direction to be listed here). 
 
As for the desirability, which should be a concern that precedes its feasibility, there is ample 
academic debate in political philosophy and in international relations theory. It can be summed 
up as International Democratic Theory - that has now developed in part into a large literature on 
Global Democracy (Held 1995; 1998; Beetham 2006) or Global Governance (Morata 2011; 
Stavridis, Cancela, Ponce de León, Guardatti 2011) or even Global Cosmopolitanism (Archibugi 
2004; Marchetti 2006; Zürn 2000). There is also a huge literature on European-wide democracy 
and in particular its democratic deficit(s) (see above). What follows refer to those questions by 
considering the existence of no less than seven deficits (see below). Their existence does not 
mean that it is not possible to control democratically the CFSP/CSDP. It simply means that first 
deficits have to be identified and then corrected. Furthermore, the feasibility of such an exercise 
should not be seen as an obstacle to the desirability of doing so. On the contrary, because there 
are deficits they need to be bridged if only according to the theory of international democracy 
and the stated objectives of the EU institutions and its member states. 
 
Three options are available to achieve the goal of multi-state democracy system (Attinà 2001): 
- to control the supranational institutions by national democratic means; 
- to build up specific mechanisms of democratic control at the supranational level; 
                                                     
6 See also Penders (1988); Bieber (1990); Stavridis (1993; 1997; 2001; 2006); Lodge (1994a; 1994b); Diedrichs 
(2004); Wagner (2005); Fernández Fernández (2007); Comelli (2010); Lord (2011); Peters, Wagner, Dietelhoff 
(2010); Wouters, Raube (2012). 
7 The literature is now vast, here is a selection: Sjostedt (1977); Wallace, Allen (1977);  Wallace (1983); 
Schoutheete (1986); Weiler, Wessels (1988); Soetendorp (1994); Regelsberger et al. (1997); Pijpers et al. (1988); 
Ginsberg (1989); Allen, Smith (1990); Nuttall (1992); Hill (1998); Durand, Vasconcelos (1998); Smith H. (2002); 
Smith K. (2003); Hill, Smith M. (2005); Stavridis, Fernández Sola (2011); Wong, Hill (2011);  Telò, Ponjaert 
(2013); Baun, Marek (2013); Keukeleire, Delreux (2014). 
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- To create democratic mechanisms of the nation-state in the multi-state (multi-level and 
multi-nation). 
 
The first option is the one favoured by the more intergovernmentalilst-minded analysts; the 
second is the one tried at the EP level, and the third is a kind of transfer of national democratic 
mechanisms to the EU level, especially through the politicization and parliamentarization of the 
EU over time (socialization, Europeanization, European-wide political parties, etc.). 
 
Another way (Angelopoulou, Stavridis 2013) to look at the same issue from a wider perspective 
is to consider the EU as a “compound polity” characterized by various levels and dimensions of 
decision and policy making (i.e centres of population, member-states, sub-national units, etc...). 
There is a need to distinguish between a “horizontal” and a “vertical” interpretation of multi-
level parliamentarism in the case of the EU: 
 
 In a vertical interpretation, multi-level parliamentarism is a concept for transforming the 
EU into a federal state (Morgan 2005). 
 An alternative idea for interpreting the meaning of multi-level parliamentarism is to 
employ a horizontal idea of democracy. According to this idea, the EU is not to become a 
quasi-federal state but would remain instead a governance regime among democracies 
(Müller 2011, Nicolaides 2013). Its role is not to supersede the member states’ 
democracies with a new layer of supranational democracy but to provide an instrument 
for internalizing the external effects of member states’ decisions. National parliaments 
remain the most important sites for democratic decision-making, with the EP 
collaborating with the Council and the Commission in filling the regulatory gaps that 
national parliaments’ functional limitations leave open. The EU’s institutional order 
would follow more the concept of a pluralistic democracy than that of a homogeneous 
democracy. 
 
This hybrid model of democratic control (that combines federal and supranational integration 
characteristics together with confederal, inter-governmental ones) is actually what the IPC on 
CFSP/CSDP has tried to achieve (see below). 
 
But what are the “seven” deficits? What follows offers a succinct list that will not be developed 
here for reasons of space (it does not deal with questions of “input” and “output” legitimacies 
and means of control either (see Verdun, Christiansen 2001). 
 
But what are the “seven” deficits in CFSP/CSDP? In fact, there are “3+2+2 deficits” which are 
described in what follows. 
 
The “3 deficits” refer to the wider democratic deficit in EU integration (Schmitter 2000; Verdun, 
Stavridis 2001) which consists of three dimensions: institutional, socio-psychological, and 
informational. 
 
The first - institutional – deficit (Dehousse 1997; Verdun 1998) contains various dimensions 
ranging from a lack of transfer of competencies from the national to the EU level, a 
strengthening of executive dominance at the EU level (European Council, etc.), the power of 
comitology, including a regulatory system (Majone 1996). All of them lead to a relative 
parliamentary decline at the national level and therefore less democratic control (Chryssochou 
et.al. 1998). 
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As for the second - socio-psychological – deficit, it is mainly concerned with the absence of a 
European-wide demos (Chryssochoou 2001), a yet to develop common citizenry, and even a 
decreasing support in most EU national public opinions, especially now that there is an end to 
“passive consensus”, and a rise of euro- scepticism (even euro-phobia) as witnessed in the recent 
Euro-elections of May 2014. In addition, public support for member states remains superior at 
the national level to any support for European integration. There are alternative demoi with 
stronger democratic legitimacy to that of a possible emerging European-wide demos. 
 
Finally, the third – informational – deficit concerns a general lack of knowledge and interest in 
how EU institutions work and the rather confused and confusing processes on “complex 
democracy” that the EU represents (Innerarity 2012). 
 
The other “2 deficits” cover the fact that if at the EU foreign policy level there exists a large 
democratic deficit (because of the limited role of the EP among other things), this is further 
exacerbated by the pre-existence of a number of similar deficits at the national levels of EU 
member states´ own foreign policies. Most national parliaments have very little powers in 
international affairs although there is a vast variation across the 28 national parliaments in the 
EU. 
 
Moreover, and this represents the other “2 deficits” which result from gaps not only in foreign 
policy but also in security/defence policy. In foreign policy, there exist wide deficits, especially 
over “secrecy”, executive-dominance, but also a lack of public interest, and also ignorance, over 
international affairs. In security/defence policy the gaps are even wider, especially in “hard” 
security issues, let alone, where applicable, nuclear policies. These two gaps provide a combined, 
cumulative, additional democratic gap. 
 
As a consequence, there is not one but “7 deficits” in all8! However, as noted above, this does 
not mean that fatalism should prevail. Quite the contrary: as also noted above there are means to 
try and bridge these gaps. The IPC on CFSP/CFSDP is one possible – and desirable – step in the 
right direction. The paper now turns to this new framework set up in 2012. 
 
 
PART 3:  The Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on the CFSP and the CSDP 
 
This section presents an overview and a preliminary evaluation of the IPC-CFSP/CSDP that was 
set up in September 2012 in Pafos under the Cypriot Presidency9. 
                                                     
8 In fact one could add another dimension that does not represent a deficit in itself but that does have implications de 
facto about democratic accountability of EU military operations: that is the preeminence of some EU states, usually 
large(r) ones, in defence budgets: thus, in 2010, the UK, France and Germany accounted for 65% of the 27 EU 
national defence budgets; another five (Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Poland) represented another 23%. 
That means 8 countries account for 88% of all defence budgets (Pitarch 2010: 98).  This is particularly relevant in 
times of economic crisis and defence budget cuts as it is nowadays, but also with regard to the rise of other actors in 
the system. During the 2013 IPC Lithuania, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reminded EU 
parliamentarians that “in 2015 China´s defence budget was larger than those of the 8 EU NATO allies combined” 
(source: Lithuanian Presidency website). This situation may lead to competition between various national EU 
parliaments about issues of legitimacy and representativeness when EU military operations are engaged. For earlier 
discussions, see Bono (2005); Ioannides (2002). See also Klein (2009). For a wider discussion see Ku, Jacobson 
(2003). 
9 The respective websites of the parliamentary dimensions of the Cypriot, Irish, Lithuanian and Greek presidencies, 
which have provided the bulk of the information included in this section, are as follows: www.cyparliament2012.eu;  
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In the past, the parliamentary dimension of EU foreign, security and defence policies came under 
the aegis not only of national parliaments but also of the EP (through its foreign affairs/AFET 
Committee) as well as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) and the WEU PA. When the 
WEU slowly began to “shut down” in the early 2000s, its Clause 5 and its PA continued to be 
active for a period of time but the WEU PA finally disbanded on 30 June 2011. 
 
That created clearly a gap, especially as a result of NATO´s changing role: less focused on the 
defence of territorial integrity under Article 5, and more and more dealing with military 
interventions worldwide, but also the increasing “fascination” for the Asia-Pacific region in 
Washington. 
 
As discussed above, because EU is a hybrid system, with both supranational/ federal(istic) 
features and intergovernmental/ confederal ones, any new system of democratic control and 
accountability would need the involvement of not only the EP but also the EU national 
parliaments. 
 
It is important to add here that the role of national parliaments (with varying levels of 
accountability and control over international matters) also includes an important function that the 
EP does not so far perform fully: that of providing legitimacy. In this paper, the focus will be on 
accountability. This dimension largely explains why national parliamentarians are included in 
this IPC. That is to say that it is not only the fact that European security, let alone defence, is still 
emerging that justifies their inclusion: it is also the hybrid nature of the European integration 
process itself that accounts for it (see above). 
 
The “road to the IPC” consisted of a number of meetings and other events: first, the various 
existing committees dealing respectively with European Union Affairs, with Foreign Affairs, and 
with Defence Affairs (COSAC, COFACC & CODACC) discussed various ways to move 
towards a new control mechanism. There also occurred a ´European Parliamentary Week´ (i.e. 
MEPs and national Parliamentarians meet in Brussels to debate the European semester for 
economic policy coordination) which considered setting up an IPC for Economic and Financial 
Governance (that eventually began its work in 2013). The mimesis between the IPC under study 
here and the second on Economic and Financial Governance is quite clear (see Kreilinger 2013). 
It also means that matters of “blood and money” have come to the fore of integration. 
 
As for the IPC on CFSP/CSDP, it was further discussed at a Conference of Speakers of EU 
Parliaments in Brussels on 4-5 April 2011 where an agreement for its establishment in principle 
was made. There followed further negotiations, and a final compromise agreement was taken at 
the following Conference of Speakers that took place in Warsaw on 20-21 April 2012. 
 
To date there have been four plenary sessions of the IPC on CFSP/CSDP: 
 Pafos, September 2012; 
 Dublin, March 2013; 
 Vilnius, September 2013; 
 Athens, 3-4 April 2014. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
www.parleu2013.ie; www.lrs.lt/intl/presidency.show?theme=126&lang=2&doc=488;  
www.gr2014parliament.eu/en-gb/homepage.aspx. 
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The next session is scheduled on 6-7 November 2014 in Rome10, under the Italian Presidency.  
 
In addition, IPEX (the InterParliamentary EU information eXchange11) was set up to allow for 
the creation of a Documents database and the facilitation of a Calendar of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation meetings. 
 
As for the IPC for CFSP/CSDP Rules (as adopted in Pafos), they consist of: 
 A bi-annual plenary (with possibility of extraordinary meetings) of up to 174 
parliamentarians (plus observers): 16 MEPs, 6 parliamentarians from each EU national 
parliament (total: 162 in EU27 and 168 in EU28) and 4 each for EU candidate and 
European (non- EU) NATO members. 
 An ad hoc review committee (AHRC). 
 Languages: English and French (possible interpreting at cost of country concerned). 
 The Rotating Presidency Parliament, in close cooperation with EP, is charged with 
organizing the IPC during its term in office. 
 Its objectives are: “... Provides a framework for the exchange of information and best 
practices (...) shall debate matters of CFSP including CSDP (...) replaces COFACC and 
CODACC (...;) length of interventions ... may not exceed three (3) minutes each (...) may 
by consensus adopt non-binding conclusions on CFSP and CSDP matters related to the 
agenda of the [IPC] (the conclusions do not bind national Parliaments or the European 
Parliament or prejudge their positions)”. 
  The HR is invited to the meetings to “set out the priorities and strategies of the EU in the 
area of CFSP and CSDP”. 
 Public meetings unless otherwise agreed, usually available online. 
 
As for the topics discussed and the actors involved, the chairs/speakers of parliaments or 
committees of the Presidency country are always present and active. The following table (Table 
1) presents in a telegraphic style who attended and what was discussed at the various plenary 
sessions to date. 
 
Table 1 (source: websites, author’s summary) 
 Invited speakers included: Topics and activities included: 
Pafos, 9-10 
September 
2012 
Catherine Ashton, Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato 
Kozakou-Marcoullis, EU Special Representative 
for the Southern Mediterranean Bernardino de 
León, invited representatives from Middle East and 
North Africa including parliamentarians from 
Jordan and Lebanon 
Adoption Rules of Procedure (+18 months 
review process) 
Arab Spring; the need to enhance the 
democratic engagement of the EU through 
CFSP/CSDP thanks to parliamentarians, 
especially in Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhood 
Dublin, 24-
25 March 
2013 
Lady Ashton, and the Deputy PM, and Foreign, 
and Justice/ Equality/ Defence Minister (Ireland) 
and the Deputy Secretary-General of the European 
External Action Service. 
Commencement of review procedure 
(including a calendar). 
Cypriot parliament proposal for fact-finding 
mission in S & E neighbourhood. 
2 workshops: comprehensive approach on 
Africa and the MEPP. 
                                                     
10 “Rome” does not follow the usual six-monthly gaps due to the Euro-elections and the need to appoint new leaders 
in the various EU posts including that of the High Representative for the CFSP and the CSDP. 
11 www.ipex.eu9. 
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Vilnius, 4-6 
September 
2013 
Lady Ashton, the President and the Foreign and 
Defence ministers (Lithuania) and the NATO 
Secretary-General. 
Syria and comprehensive approach and 
external dimension of EU energy policy & 
ENP & Review of ESS and the European 
Defence Council and the future of IPC the 
AHRC. 
Athens, 3-4 
April 2014 
Lady Ashton, and the Foreign & Defence ministers 
(Greece) and the EEAS Deputy Secretary-General 
for Inter-institutional Affairs. 
Priorities of the Greek Presidency, Ukraine, 
Syria, Egypt, December 2013 Council and 
Ad Hoc Review Committee. 
3 Workshops on EU Maritime Security 
Strategy, maritime dimension of CSDP & 
recent developments in the Middle East & 
Deploying military forces under CSDP, 
parliamentary decision making procedures 
and practices. 
 
 
Table 2 lists the number of parliamentarians who have participated in the IPCs to date. 
 
Table 2: Parliamentary participants to date (source: websites, author’s calculations) 
 National 
parliamentarians 
MEPs Parliamentarians 
from Observers 
parliaments 
Other 
parliamentarians 
total 
PAFOS 104 14 10 4 128/132 
DUBLIN 101 15 19  135 
VILNIUS 103 16 14  133 
ATHENS 88 8 13  109 
 
No one delegation had sent its maximum of 6 national parliamentarians to all events. During the 
first three events: 
 Those who sent at least twice are Cyprus (hosts in Pafos), Germany, Greece, Lithuania 
(hosts in Vilnius), Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, i.e. 8 parliaments out of 27/28. 
 But in Vilnius there was only 1 parliamentarian from the UK. 
 Spain, all 6 in Dublin, and “only” 5 other two meetings. 
 Other “5s” include Belgium, Croatia, Luxembourg (twice), Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia. 
 None went to Dublin from Belgium, Cyprus, or the Italian Senate. 
 None from Slovakia went to Vilnius. 
 
In Athens (April 2014), only Greece (hosts), Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Sweden send 6 
representatives each. Five parliamentarians each came from Austria, Germany, Poland, Romania 
and Spain. That means that only a very small number of EU parliaments have used their full 
allocation of parliamentary participation and that only happened 3 times out of 4, including two 
host countries: Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. Therefore, and this was included from the 
first such Conference, there is a need for reforms to make it more efficient, if only in terms of 
attendance. 
 
Proposals for IPC reforms include (there is a useful summary paper by the Greek  Parliament 
from which the following information is taken): 
 
12 
 
 for a smoother process prior, during and after each session: such as distribution of written 
documents, especially by the HR or a bi-annual transfer report by the IPC presidency, an 
e-mailing system12, smaller groups, Q&A, workshops –which already in place de facto-, 
discussion papers, participation of special guests and specialists – again, they already 
occur. 
 Who participates: from now (16 MEPs plus 6 parliamentarians for each EU member 
state) to a new system based on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE)13? 
 Languages: to add the German language? 
 Adoption of conclusions: no longer consensus, QMV and quorum? 
 No need for permanent presidency. 
 The possibility to set up Political Groups: 6 members of at least 5 different delegations 
(Germany in favour, The Netherlands against). 
 To set up fact-finding mission (sponsored by Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, the UK) but this was finally withdrawn on 21 February 
2014 at a meeting in Athens. 
 
 
Conclusions: The wider implications of Lisbon´s new control and accountability 
arrangements for European and Global Governance 
 
The long road to a common EU foreign, security and defence policies continues. No doubt, in a 
globalized world no single EU country, however large, can have a similar impact on the still 
emerging post-Cold War system as the EU as a whole. To greater EU cohesion, greater impact 
greater - as recent events in Libya in 2011 or in Ukraine in 2013-2014 have shown. Even though 
some discrepancies among EU states and institutions continue, recent events have shown some 
substantial progress since the low times of Iraq in 2003. 
 
Moreover, recent research has also shown that the EP´s international role is also emerging, 
including on issues traditionally associated with state diplomacy such as the implementation of 
R2P in Libya (Stavridis, Fernández Molina 2013). 
 
Thus, whereas the IPC on CFSP/CSDP represents an interesting development for transnational 
and supranational supervision of international affairs, it will be particularly relevant to study the 
implication of its forthcoming review procedure package. Indeed, this new system of democratic 
control should also show if it is actually producing what it is supposed to do. 
 
Moreover, there should be research on how these two new IPCs on “blood” and on “money”, as 
stated above, fit within the EU context of “proliferating” inter-parliamentary institutions (to date 
there are four of them that deal respectively with ACP countries, the Euro-Mediterranean area, 
EU-Latin American relations, and the Eastern Neighbourhood)14. In addition, there are vases 
communicants between them as for instance the March 2014 Athens Plenary session of EuroLat 
                                                     
12 See also Global Centre for ICT in Parliament (2010). 
13 The PACE system consists of a proportional system which ranges from 2 to18 representatives according to the 
respective demographic weight of its member states (www.assembly.coe.int/nw/Home-EN.asp). For more on the 
PACE, see Evans, Silks (2008). 
14 On ACP, see Delputte (2012; 2013); on the Mediterranean, see Stavridis (2002b), Seimenis, Makriyannis, (2005); 
Pace, Stavridis (2010); on Latin America see Malamud, de Sousa (2007); Stavridis, Ajenjo, (2010); Ajenjo, 
Stavridis (2011); Fernández Fernández (2011); and on the Eastern neighbours, see Kostanyan, Vandecasteele 
(2013). 
13 
 
showed with discussions not only on EU-Latin American relations but also on Ukraine or Syria 
(author´s participation). 
 
Thus, the developing role of the IPC on CFSP/CSDP should also be analyzed through the prisms 
of other new international phenomena: the role of parliamentary diplomacy (Sénat 2001; 
Stavridis 2002a; Parliamentary Centre 2003; Eloriagga 2004; Weisglas, Boer 2007; Fiott 2011) 
and the proliferation of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs)15 (Cutler 2001; 2006; IPU 
2005; Puig 2008; Šabič 2008a; 2008b; 2013; Kissling 2011; Cofelice 2012; Malamud, Stavridis 
2011; Costa et al. 2013; UNU-CRIS 2014). Comparative research could (and should) provide 
useful insights and findings. Moreover, there should also be more work on how the work of 
parliamentarians links with civil society at large (in the case of the Mediterranean, see Lannon 
2002; Pace, Stavridis, Xenakis 2004); and finally as the current Global system is one of multi-
actors and multi-levels (see Grau 2011), there should also be work on how this IPC links into 
sub-state parliamentary activities in the world (parliamentary para-diplomacy) (Navarro 2003; 
Brunet et al. 2004; García Chourio 2011; Ortega Pérez 2013; Feliu 2013). 
 
The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development, it remains only a step in 
the right direction due to the existence of numerous democratic deficits in the foreign, security 
and defence policies of the EU and its member states. It is a necessary but not a sufficient (or 
panacea for that matter) solution to a key question for the future of democratic control and 
legitimacy of EU foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 For the EP as an IPI, see Cofelice, Stavridis (2014). 
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